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RESTRICTED 
ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 
A lecture delivered by 
Col. Richard C. Mangrum, USMC 
at the Naval War College 
August 15, 1949 
Important changes were made in the whole structure for 
national security when Congress passed the National Security 
Act of 1947. During the past two years most of us in the armed 
forces have become more or less familiar with these changes and 
with their impact on all phases of military operations. 
As you know, the President has recently signed another bill 
entitled "The National Security Act Amendments of 1949." It is 
particularly timely, therefore, to discuss the Organization for Na­
tional Security in the light of these newest changes with which 
we must also become familiar. 
All of us urgently need to. understand what is going on. If 
I can indicate how some of the pieces of the puzzle fit together, 
we may be better able to see the present Organization for National 
Security as a whole picture. During the year you will have the 
opportunity to examine the picture in more detail. 
At the Naval War College graduation ceremonies last May, 
Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball made some significant 
and challenging remarks. 
"The very nature of the National Military Establishment 
is being altered at the top and all of you will be remiss in 
your duty if you do not endeavor to comprehend what 
these changes mean." 
Colonel Mangrum is a member of the Naval War College Staff. 
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"The trend is now toward closer and more intimate con .. 
trol at the center, a control that goes far beyond policy. 
This means, naturally, less flexibility of action for the 
man on the spot. If you are to function properly under 
these new conditions you must give them cool and studious 
reflection, and more than that, you must apply yourselves 
with care to working within the limitations they impose." 
It very patently behooves us, therefore, to see what these 
new conditions are and what new kind of organization this is, if 
we are to operate usefully within it. 
The National Security Council. 
Under the general title, Organization for National Secur­
ity, I wish to discuss first the agencies which are outside of the 
Department of Defense and responsible directly to the President. 
The first of these is the National Security Council. 
The Council brings together officially the civilian heads of 
those Federal agencies which are largely responsible for our na­
tional security. The permanent membership of the Council now 
consists of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of 
State, the Secretary of Defense, and the chairman of the National 
Security Resources Board. The changes recently made in the law 
added the Vice-President, and removed the three service secretaries. 
The President has authority, subject to the advice and consent of 
the Senate, to add other members on a temporary basis, and he 
has added Secretary of the Treasury Snyder. Mr. Sidney Souers is 
the executive secretary of the Council. 
The function of the Council is to advise the President with 
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military pol­
icies relating to the national security. In brief, it outlines and at­
tempts to correlate our foreign policy with our military policy. It 
14 
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sees that our foreign policy does not involve commitments that are 
beyond our capabilities, or, if it does involve such action, that we 
accept it as a calculated risk. 
We won a great victory in World War II, only to find that 
after liberating a good part of Europe from one totalitarian regime, 
it is quickly falling under the influence of another. Political critics 
believe that if we had had a national objective-if we had known 
what we were after-such a situation would not have arisen. 
There is a certain amount of substance to that criticism. The 
formation of a National Security Council should prevent the re­
currence of errors in foresight, provided that it functions the 
way it should and it appears to be functioning that way now. 
This does not mean that the State Department has abdi­
cated any of its responsibilities. Secretary of State Acheson and 
his department still have the central responsibility for formulating 
important decisions at top policy levels. The National Security 
Council provides assurance that decisions are made only after a 
thorough-going estimate of the situation has been made. 
The State Department assumes the leadership role in the 
charting of foreign policy. Yet the process allows the men in the 
Pentagon-and also spokesmen for the domestic economy-to 
know what is going on, and to contribute their views before an 
issue is finally decided. 
The composition of the Council gave rise to considerable 
concern over possible military domination of our foreign policy. 
These fears may be somewhat allayed by the removal of three 
of the four civilian heads of the military departments. As a mat­
ter of practice, matters that come before the Council are referred 
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military point of view. The Joint 
Chiefs are said to confine themselves very definitely to a military 
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point of view, so there seems to be not too much cause for concern 
about military domination of our foreign policy. In any event, it is 
sheer folly to imagine that policy can be made in these times with­
out reference to the immediate realities of the strategic situation. 
The President has personally attended about a fourth of the 
Security Council sessions, which usually take place every two weeks. 
Whether he attends or not, the deliberations of the Council are 
brought to his desk within twenty-four hours by Mr. Souers and 
the President takes prompt action on the recommendations which 
have been made. Most authorities now seem to feel that the Na­
tional Security Council is making a material contribution to our 
security and to our foreign policy. 
Central Intelligence Agency. 
Under the National Security Council we have the Central 
Intelligence Agency. It is established for the purpose of coordinating 
the intelligence activities of the several Government agencies and 
departments in the interests of national security. There is no in­
tention that Central Intelligence should supersede departmental in­
telligence. As Admiral Hillenkoetter, the Director, says: 
"We couldn't get along without the departmental agencies. 
They are our biggest suppliers as· well as our best custom­
ers. CIA would be a head without a body if it did not 
have them." 
The CIA has no police, subpoena, law enforcement, or in­
ternal security functions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
which does have these functions, operates only in the domestic 
field. The FBI is required by law to make available to the CIA 
anything which may be essential to national security. Again to para­
phrase Admiral Hillenkoetter-"they work very closely together." 
The function of the CIA, in brief, is to obtain information 
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which concerns the national security, correlate it, evaluate it, 
and disseminate the results to those who need to use it. Thus, 
it serves not only its principal, the National Security Council, but 
all other appropriate agencies of the government as well. 
National Security Resources Board. 
On the same level as the National Security Council we have 
the National Security Resources Board. It is also directly responsi­
ble to the President. It's membership consists of the Secretaries 
of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and 
Labor, and a Chairman appointed by the President. 
The job of the NSRB is the allocation of the human and 
material resources of the nation in furtherance of a war effort. 
It advises the President concerning the coordination of mili­
tary; industrial, and civilian mobilization. It has no direct com­
mand function. The board provides the nuclei, which in time of war 
would be expanded into such offices of economic command as an Of­
fice of War Manpower, Office of Economic Stabilization, Office of 
Economic Warfare, Office of War Transportation, Office of Price 
Administration, and so on. 
Part of the NSRB's "Preliminary Plan for Economic Mobili­
zation" is the drafting of emergency legislation to provide the 
President with emergency powers, and for the creation of these 
economic commands. 
The delays in the mobilization of this country in World War 
II would have been disastrous had our Allies not acted a1:1 a buff er be­
tween us and the enemy while we organized our resources. The 
Congress has presently foreseen that if the nation is to be bet­
ter prepared in the future to defend itself against aggression, it 
is necessary to plan our economic command -beforehand. 
17 
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It is important to maintain the clear distinction between 
the NSRB and the Munitions Board, which comes directly under the 
Secretary of Defense. The two Boards work closely together. The 
Munitions Board consolidates the requirements of the Armed 
Services and sends them to the NSRB. When the NSRB has allocated 
certain resources to the military establishment, the Munitions Board 
handles the detailed arrangements for the use of this allocation. 
I shall have more to say about the Munitions Board later on. 
Mobilization planning must be continuous. The Security 
Act recognizes the interdependence of strategic and economic 
planning. The NSRB and the Munitions Board together are as­
sembling the data for testing the economic feasibility of strategic 
plans developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Quick approximations 
will be made of military requirements on 240 items which the 
Munitions Board believes will represent a significant percentage of 
total requirements. The NSRB, with the aid of other government de­
partments, will develop estimates of the requirements of the in­
dustrial and civilian economy. Total requirements will be compared 
with estimates of resources so that, within a short time, the Board 
can tell the military establishment the degree to which its strategic 
plan is feasible. 
The two chief criteria for unification efforts were to be ef­
ficiency and economy. The key function of the NSRB is the ef­
fective wartime use of resources, balancing military and civilian 
requirements. Wartime effectiveness is the ultimate goal. It may 
be necessary in times of international tension, as well as in war­
time,· to forego economies and administrative efficiencies which 
could be achieved under purely peacetime conditions� Conversely, 
it may be necessary to sacrifice somemobilization.potential to meet 
budgetary realities. during peacetime;.._in which case, economies 
and administrative efficiencies are invoked, not by military choice;, 
but through practical necessity. 
l8 
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There is some difference of opinion about how things are 
going in the NSRB (as indeed in the whole organization for Nation­
al Security). Mr. Bernard Baruch recently quarreled with the 
White House about the extent of, or lack of, mobilization planning. 
At present the NSRB does not have a permanent chairman. The 
President has not yet submitted a new nomination as chairman 
since Mr. Wallgren was turned down by the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. Mr. John Steelman, of the President's Staff, is acting 
chairman. 
The National Security Resources Board, the National Se­
curity Council, the CIA, and the Department of Defense constitute 
the present structure for National Security. If we are to under­
stand fully the structure of the Defense Department itself, it is im­
portant to have thorough-going recognition of the functions of 
these other agencies. They are the political and economic balance­
wheels for the military. 
The Department of Defense 
The Department of Defense is a 15 billion dollar insurance 
business in this fiscal year 1950. No one in this room is unaware 
of the fact that the policy holders haven't been too happy about 
the way the business is being run. They seem to have the idea 
that the directors could reduce the cost of this insurance by large 
percentages if only they would leave their brass knuckles outside 
the board of directors' room and agree on everything. One school of 
thought would simply hand all the brass knuckles over to one in­
dividual who would use them only when necessary, of course, but for 
the common good. 
The record shows, however, that much progress has been 
made in two years under new management. It is a different kind of 
management and not easy for people either in or out of the service 
to understand quickly. Habit patterns change slowly. 
19 
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A quote from the conclusion of one of the speeches by the 
late Mr. Forrestal is to the point: 
"I do not wish to leave with you the impression that the 
job is done. It is far from done and it will be a sub­
stantial time before it is. I say to you quite frankly that 
I have preferred to make haste slowly, because I have had 
constantly in mind that we are charged with a heavy 
and great responsibility-the security of the nation. In 
the process of achieving a new form of organization, we 
must be sure we retain the capacity to fight successfully. 
Charts cannot win battles." 
Let us turn then to an examination of what composes this 
job of reorganization as specified by the National Security Act. 
First, what did the Congress intend to do? The Declaration 
of Policy in the Act is short and it will be useful to keep it in 
mind. It reads as follows: 
20 
"Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation it is the intent of 
Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the 
future security of the United States; to provide for the 
establishment of integrated policies and procedures for 
the departments, agencies, and functions of the Govern­
ment relating to the National Security; 
to provide three military departments for the operation 
and administration of the Army, Navy, (including naval 
aviation and the Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with. 
their assigned combat and service components; 
to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified 
.direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense 
but not to merge them; * 
*Italicized portions indicate additions to this section by the Na­
tional Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 216). 
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to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed 
forces and for their operation under unified control and 
for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval 
and air forces, but not to establish a single Chief of Staff 
over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff, 
( but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff). * 
This is, of course, an attempt to improve the administration 
of National Security. 
Regarding administration, Mr. Reginald Gillmor, former 
Vice-Chairman of the NSRB and for many years president of the 
Sperry Corporation, has some timely things to say. He speaks of an 
"Ultimate Science", as old as history, which has no name but whose 
objective is order; order among men; order which will permit their 
free cooperation and the release and use of all their varied talents 
and skills. 
The instruments for this potential science of order are known 
by such terms as government, management, organization, and ad­
ministration. Administration is the broadest of these terms and 
can, therefore, be used to include all the others. 
In brief, he says, the two political ideologies into which the 
world is divided are primarily two ancient and mutually antagonistic 
concepts of administration. 
One, the centralization concept, based on the assumption 
that the governing organization is omniscient and that the best re­
sults will be attained if all others obey its will. 
*Italicized portions indicate additions to this section by the Na­
tional Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 216).
21 
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. 
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD 
OTHER DEPARTMENT HEADS, AS REQUESTED 
EXECUTIVE SEC.: SIDNEY W. SOUERS 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
DIRECTOR: R. ADM. R.H. HILLENKOETTER 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL 
CHAIRMAN (MILITARY) 
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY 
SEC. OF DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN 
DEP. SEC, OF DEFENSE 
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 
CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE 
SEC. OF ARMY 





SEC· OF AIR FORCE 
CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 
SECRETARY: GORDON GRAY 
UNDER SEC. : TRACY S. VOORHEES 
T HE ASST. SEC.: 
ASST. SEC. : ARCHIBALD S. ALEXANDER 
DEPARTMEN ,: 
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1 .. LER) 
SECURITY RESTRICTED 
NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD 
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 
ACTING: JOHN R. STEELMAN 
HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND 
AGENCIES OR THEIR REPRE­
SENTATIVES, AS DESIGNATED 
BY THE PRESIDENT 
MUNITIONS BOARLJ RESEARCH 8 DEVELOPMENT BOARD 
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD (CIVILIAN) CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD (CIVldAN) 
VACANT KARL T. COMPTON 
UNDER OR ASST. SEC. OF THE ARMY 
UNDER OR ASST. SEC. OF THE NAVY 




NAVY FROM EACH, TO BE NAMED 





DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
SECRETARY: W. STUART SYMINGTON 
UNDER SEC,: ARTHUR S. BARROWS 
ASST. SEC,: 
ASST. SEC, : EUGENE M. ZUCKERT 
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The other, or decentralization concept, based on the as­
sumption that the governing organization is a ministry for provid­
ing order and that the best results come from the maximum of 
delegation and individual freedom. 
So, the new organization for national security can be said 
to be a foray into the field of this "ultimate science" with a greater 
degree of order as its objective. Mr. Gillmor's definitions may 
help to explain why the road we are traveling has not been without 
its bumps. 
The Secretary of Defense 
The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 makes the 
Defense Department an Executive Department of the Government. 
The Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments are no longer execu­
tive departments. They are now military departments of the De­
partment of Defense. The three service secretaries retain their 
titles but they no longer have Cabinet status and are now clearly 
subordinate to the Secretary of Defense. 
'The Office of Under Secretary of Defense was established 
in April of this year and Mr. Stephen T. Early is the first incumbent. 
The title of this office has now been changed to Deputy Secretary 
and he takes precedence over the three service secretaries. 
The principal changes effected in the Secretary's Office by 
the Amendments Act clarify Mr. Johnson's authority to direct and 
control. He is now provided with direct authority over the military 
budget. 
The 1947 Act provided for three Special Assistants to the 
Secretary. These special assistants are now given the rank of As­
sistant Secretaries of Defense and they take precedence next after 
24 
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the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
There probably will be some internal changes in the organi­
zation of these offices, but it is too soon to tell what they may be. 
Until the present time, the three special assistants have presided 
over such offices as : 
Office of Counsel 
Office of Legislative Liaison 
Office of the Budget 
Office of Accounting Policy 
Office of Progress Reports and Statistics 
Administrative Office and Secretariat 
Mr. McNeil's Office of the Budget is, of course, a vitally im­
portant function in the new Secretary's Office. The 1950 budget is 
the first to be submitted in accordance with the National Security 
Act. It was bound to run into many new administrative difficulties. 
These are particularly sharpened because of the colossal size of the 
military budget compared to the remainder of the Federal Budget. 
In a lecture at the National War College last year, Mr. 
McNeil said, relative to the problems of his Office of the Budget: 
"The concepts of what should comprise the budget function 
may be as numerous as the number of agencies or the num­
ber of people asked to comment on the subject. They would 
range from the concept that the budget's primary job is 
procurement of funds, to the other extreme wherein the 
budget function dictates to all phases of operations. My 
own concept of the budget function is that it should be 
much more than a procurement device. It must be an ef­
fective tool for management." 
25 
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The influence of the budget on the whole organization of the 
Department of Defense, and indeed, on national objectives and na­
tional strategy, cannot be minimized. It is well to try to understand 
all that we can of the principles which underlie the. new adminis­
tration of the military budget. 
This is a good place to mention, briefly, another of the 
changes recently effected. Title IV of the 1949 Amendments Act 
contains various provisions all of which are intended to implement 
the Secretary's authority over the military budget, and to revise 
the whole fiscal structure. While it is a vitally important provision of 
the new law, it can be excluded from this discussion of organization. 
The Act also provides that one of the new Assistant Secre­
taries shall be the Comptroller of the Department of. Defense. The 
Office of Comptroller is also established in each military department. 
Armed Forces Policy Council. 
Dropping down now from the Office. of the Secretary, let's 
see who advises or works for the Secretary. First, there is an ad­
visory body, the Armed Forces Policy Council. This was formerly 
called the War Council. It's name and composition have been changed 
by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act 
It now consists of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy 
Secretary, the three service secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs and the three Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Council advises the 
Secretary on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces. 
Examples are the military aid program, and policy under certain 
budget cuts. 
We don't need to spend much time on the Policy Council. 
It should be noted, however, that the Secretary of Defense is Chair­
man of the Council and the law provides him with power of decision. 
26 
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This gives force to his position, and in a sense, gives him direct com­
mand powers, emphasizing the trend toward the "centralization con­
cept." 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
We should take µp next the organization of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the Joint Staff. All the remaining activities of the Depart­
ment of Defense are conditioned by the work of the Joint Chiefs. 
It should be noted and remembered that the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff actually were an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of 
Staff. Here, the military leaders of sovereign nations met to formu­
late broad strategy and programs · for World War II. To insure 
prior agreement among U. S. members, it was necessary that they 
first meet together for preliminary discussions. Thereafter, they 
became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
No legislative or executive action was taken to formalize the 
existence of the JCS until passage of the National Security Act of 
1947. The absence of any specific charter gave great flexibility to 
the organization and allowed it to develop according to need as the 
war progressed. 
The National Security Act incorporated the JCS organiza­
tion into law approximately as it existed at the end of the war� 
The Act preserves the Joint Chiefs' status as the principal military 
advisors to the President; and gives· them a similar status with 
respect to the Secretary of Defense. 
Now, ·.the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
has · been ,created� He takes· precedence over all ,other officers , of 
the- armed services, but does· not have military command' over the 
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officer and provides agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs, and 
assists them to prosecute their business promptly. He has no vote 
in Joint Chiefs decisions, however. It is also his job to inform the 
Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate, the President, when 
the Joint Chiefs cannot agree on an issue. 
The functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are summarized 
as follows: 
(1) Preparation of strategic plans and prov1s10n for the
strategic direction of the military forces.
(2) Preparation of joint logistic plans and assignment ,of
logistic responsibilities.
(3) Establishment of unified commands.
( 4) Review of material and personnel requirements.
(5) Formulation of policies for joint training.
(6) Formulation of policies for coordinating military education.
(7) Provision for representation on Military Staff Committee
of the U. N.
One of these functions, you will note, is the establishment 
of unified commands in strategic areas when such commands are 
in the interest of national security. Initially, unified commands 
were set up where possible hostile action might require a single 
commander who could act without waiting to hear from Washing­
ton. Time and experience have proven that it is necessary to go 
even further in the delegation of authority to these unified com­
manders. This is required mainly in the logistic field in order to 
secure greater unification of both manpower and material. It is 
evident that the unified command plan is here to stay as the means 
of directing offensive operations in time of war. 
28 
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 2 [1949], No. 8, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol2/iss8/3
RESTRICTED 
At present, there are six unified commands. These are: Far 
East, Pacific, Alaska, Carribean, Atlantic, and Europe. The Com­
manders-in-Chief of these commands report directly to the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Three other commanders also report directly to 
the Joint Chiefs-the Commanding General of the Strategic Air 
Command, the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, Austria, and the 
Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and 
Mediterranean. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization has two major ele­
ments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committees and the Joint Staff. 
The Committees are charged with the preparation of plans for the 
JCS. The committee members are officers whose primary assignment 
is with the Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The chair­
man of each committee is a Deputy Director of the Joint Staff. 
The three principal committees are-Strategic Plans, Intelligence, 
and Logistic Pians. 
The Joint Staff is headed by a Director and consists of 210 
officers, the limit under present law. They are drawn equally from 
the three services, and their sole duty assignment is to the Joint 
Staff. The Joint Staff is divided into three main Groups, Strategic 
Plans, Intelligence, and Logistic Plans, and each Group is headed 
by the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff who is also chairman of 
the related committee. The relationship between the groups and 
their parent committees is substantiallly the same as the re­
lationship between a commander and his staff. 
The size of the Joint Staff precludes it from becoming a 
fact-finding body in its own right, and it depends, therefore, upon 
information received from fact-finding agencies, boards, and com­
mittees of the services. Joint Committees under the Joint Staff 
Director have been organized for this purpose. For example, the 
17
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Joint Communication-Electronics Committee is composed of the 
senior officers of the communications components of the three serv­
ices; namely, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, the Chief of 
Na val Communications, and the Air Force Director of Communica­
tions. This committee is concerned with establishing common com­
munications procedures and doctrines. 
The most difficult of the several types of strategic plans 
which the Joint Chiefs must face is the outline war plan for 
Mobilization Planning and Industrial Mobilization Planning. If we 
consider this type of plan for a moment, you will see the extent to 
which the whole Defense Department is dependent on the proper 
production of such plans by the Joint Chiefs. 
It must be. understood, first, that the outline war plans of th� 
JCS are not detailed operational plans. The outline strategic plan, 
as such, consists of four essentials: 
(1) A statement of national war objectives.
(2) Statement of enemy capabilities
(3) A broad general concept of operations, and
(4) A statement of a number of time-phased military
tasks to be undertaken by our forces, including state­
ment of the major tactical units to perform the tasks.
This outline war plan for Mobilization Planning and In­
dustrial Mobilization Planning forms the basis for the Mobiliza­
tion Plans of the three services, and for the Joint Mobilization 
Plan. It is, in fact, the basis for the work of the Munitions Board. 
Thus, you can see that things must move along smoothly in the 
Joint Chiefs' office if anybody else is going to do his work properly. 
30 
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This is a good point at which to move our discussion along 
to the Munitions Board. The Munitions Board ·must have the phased 
requirements of the . three Mobilization Plans for end products, 
raw materials, industrial installations and facilities. 
Thereafter, in order to avoid the possibility of doing a lot 
of unnecessary work on Industrial Mobilization Planning for a 
strategic plan which is too fat for the industrial capacity of the 
country, the Munitions Board conducts an industrial feasibility test 
early in the planning cycle. 
To do this, they choose about 240 of the more important end 
products and get "flash" estimates of these requirements from 
the services. These are compared with estimates of industrial 
plant capacity. 
It might be said, by way of summar1zmg the foregoing, 
that in the logistic field the Joint Chiefs are responsible for deter­
mining the "what", "where", and "when", and the Munitions Board 
the "how". 
It would require too much detail to explore further the 
functioning of the Munitions Board. Members of the Board are 
the Under or Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force, with a civilian chairman appointed by the President. 
The Board clearly possesses certain executive authority, 
stemming from the Secretary of Defense. It differs in this respect 
from the National Security Resources Board. Those who criticize 
the weakness of the NSRB seem to fear that the Munitions Board, 
as part of the Department of Defense, would usurp the_ functions of 
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the NSRB if war should come suddenly, and that the national econ.
omy would thereby come under military domination. 
Research and Development Board 
So much, then, for the major planning and directing agen­
cies of the Department of Defense. The last statutory agency created 
by the National Security Act of 1947 is the Research and Develop­
ment Board. This board is an outgrowth of the Joint Board created 
in 1946 by the Secretaries of War and Navy. 
The Board consists of a Chairman, appointed from civilian 
life by the President, and two representatives from each military 
department. The present chairman is Dr. Karl T. Compton. The 
Board is our means of keeping abreast of scientific discoveries and 
of finding military applications for them. The chief responsibility of 
the Board is to prepare integrated programs of research and devel­
opment, in the light of which the individual projects of the Army, 
Navy and Air Force can be evaluated. The Board decides who de­
velops what weapons. It makes sure that there is no unnecessary 
duplication in the activities of the three services. 
The Board operates principally through its twenty odd 
committes, covering the whole broad field of science. The commit­
tees are composed of top-ranking civilian scientists, officers of the 
three services, and representatives of other government agencies. 
The Research and Development Board is, then, a staff 
agency of the Secretary of Defense, to insure maximum exploitation 
of the scientific potential of the nation. Both the Research and De­
velopment Board and the Munitions Board are affected in the 
same way by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. The 
authority of the Secretary to direct and control is clarified, and the 
responsibility of both·Boards to the Secretary is made specific. 
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In view of the high cost of research and development, the 
Board gave serious consideration to evaluating weapons and 
weapons systems at an earlier stage. As a result of its recommenda­
tions, the Secretary of Defense established the Weapons Systems 
Evaluation Group last December. This Group takes its direction 
from the Secretary but is now responsive to both the Research and 
Development Board and the Joint Chiefs. The directive which es­
tablished the Group provided that after one year of organization 
and trial, it would become a component of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
This is a good example of the many evolutionary processes 
that have been going on in the Organization for National Security 
in the past two years. 
Conclusion 
Each of the several agencies of the Organization for Na­
tional Security provides ample material for study which is import­
ant to us here. As a matter of fact, you will hear visiting speakers 
from a number of these agencies during the year. 
I have summarized what,we might call the staff and command 
aspects of the Organization for National Security. The three mili­
tary departments complete the structure and you will hear about 
them in presentations to follow. 
This presentation was designed simply to highlight the re­
lationships between the various parts of the organization and pro­
vide an introduction-a point of departure for your own further 
study. 
This is the way things are today. I mentioned earlier that 
not everyone was satisfied and happy with this new organization. No 
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doubt further changes will be proposed in time. If the past is any 
criterion, we can probably expect strong differences of opinion on 
new proposals to alter the structure. 
I will conclude this presentation, then, by referring again to 
Mr. Kimball's admonishment of last May-
84 
"You will be remiss in your duty if you do not endeavor 
to comprehend what these changes mean." 
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